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Abstract 
 
Over the past sixty years, the Republic of Ireland has experienced two forms of 
americanisation. One of these was aid during the early post-war decades from the US 
government or from European agencies that owed their existence to US government 
funding, like the European Productivity Agency. The second was investment by US 
private corporations that began to increase in importance from the late 1960s. This 
paper notes some contrasts between the two. The early period was one in which a 
productivity drive was unsuccessfully attempted: the latter was one in productivity 
statistics were rendered increasingly incredible by the transfer pricing indulged in by 
multinational corporations. European `free’ (as opposed to `red’) trade unions were 
promoted by US government policy against a Cold War backdrop but, as US 
corporate investment has becomes increasingly important, Irish unions in the private 
sector came to experience the same `slow strangulation’ that was being visited on 
their US counterparts.            
 Introduction 
It is now sixty years since Marshall Aid introduced industrial Technical Assistance 
and Productivity (TA&P) programmes to Ireland in 1948 (Whelan 2000: Murray 
2008). This flow of aid ceased in 1952 when Ireland would not adhere to the 
conditions attached to its provision by the US Mutual Security Act. But the 
establishment of the European Productivity Agency (EPA) within the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) created a new external TA&P source which 
operated for almost a decade after 1953. As an OEEC member, Ireland joined the 
EPA, which worked in tandem with European national productivity centres. Minimal 
Irish involvement during the EPA’s early years was reflected in the ongoing failure to 
give effect to the government’s approval in 1950 of the creation of an Irish national 
productivity centre. But by 1958 a coalition that saw the EPA as a source of vital 
resources for Ireland’s development had formed and the Irish National Productivity 
Committee (INPC) was created (Murray 2005). 
 
Supported by EPA in its early years, and securing domestic state support after the 
EPA’s disbandment, the productivity drive helped reshape Ireland’s institutions in 
significant ways as state strategy shifted from import substitution to export-oriented 
industrialisation and adopted EEC entry as its central objective. Its bringing together 
of government, business and unions made it a precursor of   a sustained social 
partnership approach to issues of adaptation to ongoing change in the international 
economic environment. It provided a forum where emerging labour policy issues, 
such as workers’ rights in a situation of redundancy, were initially raised. In addition 
to initiating support for social science research, its resources were crucial to 
establishing educational provision for managers and trade unionists. It also played a 
part in preparing the ground for the transformation of the mainstream of the Irish 
education system during the 1960s (Murray 2004, 2007 and forthcoming). But, as an 
agency of Ireland’s americanisation in the second half of the twentieth century, aid 
from US government agencies or European organisations that would not have existed 
without US government funding in this earlier period is relatively insignificant when 
compared with the foreign direct investment by US private corporations that took off 
at the end of the 1960s. This paper reflects on these two americanisations and the 
Ireland they have created.   
  
Irish Industry Then and Now 
Today the economy until recently dubbed the Celtic Tiger is dominated by the 
operations of multinational corporations. Indigenous industry plays second fiddle 
although, after suffering a period of severe contraction, it has demonstrated a renewed 
capacity to expand (O’Malley 1998). Foreign capital and expertise was certainly 
esteemed and welcomed by post-war productivity drive proponents although few, if 
any, could have envisaged the extent to which it would be attracted to Ireland or the 
centrality to Irish economic development it would assume. Attracting foreign 
investment was the task of the IDA, the agency in whose direction the project of 
creating a national productivity centre had first been steered. `For most of the 1950s’ 
IDA `was experimenting and responding to changes in the international economy and 
within Ireland’ (Girvin 1989: 180). Through most of the 1960s the mostly European 
projects it promoted generated relatively modest numbers of jobs (Black 1977 Table 
2.9: O’Malley 1989 Table 6.1) while helping to significantly increase Irish industrial 
exports. At the end of the 1960s, following a review carried out by management 
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consultants A.D. Little Inc. that prompted the amalgamation of previously separate 
agencies, the IDA emerged as an expanded and culturally revolutionised body: 
 
The Industrial Development Authority became after 1969 the key coordinator of 
industrial policy and the most significant planning agency in the Irish 
Republic… the “civil service climate” was swept away and the new managing 
director populated the IDA with new talent on contractual terms akin to 
“venture management” – they were public servants with flair (Jacobsen 1994: 
104-105) 
 
These changes took place as Irish EEC entry became first a likely prospect and then, 
in 1973, a reality. Armed with this market access, a suitably educated, English-
speaking, relatively low cost workforce plus an array of grant and tax incentives, IDA 
particularly targeted mobile US investment into Europe. It made considerable inroads 
in the 1970s, found the going much tougher in the 1980s when its policies were also 
subjected to much critical scrutiny but went on to achieve spectacular success during 
the 1990s when `nearly every major player in information technology followed Intel 
to Ireland in a few years’ (O’Hearn 2000: 74). Chemical and pharmaceutical plants 
joined with computer hardware and software to constitute the `high tech’ industrial 
core of the US-owned, IDA-attracted Celtic Tiger.  By the mid-1990s the Irish 
industrial profile was one in which: 
 
Although only 16 per cent of local plants are foreign-owned, they produce 65 
per cent of gross output and engage 47 per cent of manufacturing employment. 
About 40 per cent of foreign plants are US-owned, with 16 per cent British and 
14 per cent German-owned. Foreign plants are much more likely to import their 
raw and semi-processed material inputs than indigenous plants. Irish plants 
export on average about 36 per cent of output while foreign plants export 89 per 
cent, rising to 95 per cent for US-owned plants. Thus the domestic market is of 
little significance to the foreign plants (Barry, Bradley and O’Malley 1999:50-
51) 
    
With a government fiscal policy shift from deflation to expansion, employment 
growth in protected Irish industry – in abeyance since 1952 - resumed in the first half 
of the 1960s. In the period of tariff lowering and removal in the second half of the 
1960s and 1970s this growth stalled. The 1980s witnessed a massive wave of job 
losses in indigenous industry with 42,000 jobs or 27 per cent of the 1980 total being 
lost in the period 1980-87 (O’Malley 1989: 101-102). Thus `for most of the outward-
oriented era [from 1973] employment growth in the foreign-owned sector occurred 
alongside employment decline in indigenous industry, a particularly disappointing 
development since unemployment remained high throughout most of this period’ 
(Barry, Bradley and O’Malley 1999: 57-58). Disappointment edged closer to social 
disaster in the mid-1980s when both the foreign and indigenous industrial sectors 
were simultaneously contracting while, even with the return of mass emigration on a 
scale comparable with the 1950s, a massaged Irish unemployment rate stood close to 
20 per cent. 
 
The structural transition involved in moving from very high levels of protection to 
free trade could hardly be painless but it is reasonable to ask whether the cost might 
have been lowered if the industrial adaptation agenda of which the Irish productivity 
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drive formed a central part had been more successfully pursued in the 1960s by 
government, business and unions. Then bipartite Productivity Committees were 
stymied, tripartite Development Councils were still born while business-only 
Adaptation Councils failed in most cases to function effectively. Faced with this 
situation the state made no response. Instead it relied upon `financial linkages, 
mergers and takeovers’ - as likely, perhaps, to be prompted by asset stripping 
opportunities as by prospects of greater productive efficiency – or increased its 
funding of the IDA to woo foreign industrialists (Murray forthcoming).  
 
Ireland, it turned out, had acquired a national productivity centre without ever 
engineering a productivity coalition to sustain it.  What a productivity coalition 
entailed was a set of structures in which the state, industry and the trade union 
movement could collaborate strategically at national, industrial and firm level. 
Denmark, a state held up as a suitable productivity model for Irish emulation since the 
time of Horace Plunkett, succeeded in creating such a set of structures in the post-war 
period (Kjaer 2001). A comparison of Sweden, West Germany and the United 
Kingdom in the decade after 1945 concludes that, although its initial circumstances 
were in many ways the most favourable to the achievement of this outcome, the 
United Kingdom failed, relative to the other two states, to institutionalise a 
productivity coalition and suggests that `perhaps the key lies in [Britain’s] liberal and 
reactive state tradition’: 
 
An effective productivity coalition requires a proactive state to persuade, 
threaten, or even coerce institutions into a cooperative bargain and to develop 
the machinery of coordination that consolidates such bargains (Booth, Melling 
and Dartmann 1997: 436)  
 
`The British legacy of a weak state without a significant tradition of government 
economic intervention’ has been held to be `of crucial importance’ both in limiting the 
scope of the transformation of the Irish economy wrought by Fianna Fail policies in 
the 1930s and in subsequently inhibiting action to tackle inefficiencies in the 
protected industrial sector these policies created (Daly 1992: 176-179). Fragmentation 
rather than centralisation of authority within employer and trade union federations 
also militated against the kind of concerted anticipatory action that might have 
lessened the negative effects accompanying Irish industry’s exposure to international 
competition. Only in the depths of the 1980s crisis did state industrial policy focus on 
devising initiatives to address the problems besetting indigenous industrial 
development and government, business and unions adopt a partnership approach to 
formulating national strategy.    
 
The manner in which the new wave of US investment in the 1990s was accompanied 
by some revival of indigenous industry, with employment in the latter up 6.9% 
between 1988 and 1996, has prompted some reappraisal of the state’s role in Irish 
industrial development. The remarkable – for a country whose severely limited 
capacity for indigenous science and technology innovation has been well documented 
(Mjoset 1992: Yearley 1995) - growth of Irish software companies alongside the 
multinational giants that were locating in Ireland led O’Riain (2000) to discern the 
emergence of a `flexible developmental state’ attuned to the contemporary globalised 
economy. A substantial indigenous producer presence could develop in software 
because:   
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The state, through its heavy investment in education had created a new class 
basis for an indigenous technology promotion and business expansion agenda. 
The danger here was, of course, a massive brain drain that did indeed take place. 
However, of those who stayed, a number started their own companies and 
combined with a trickle of people from the foreign-owned sector and from user 
organizations to form a constituency that could support state agencies promoting 
indigenous development… [resulting in] a local network of indigenous firms 
that have become increasingly integrated into international business and 
technology flows and have been highly successful in international markets 
(O’Riain 2000:175) 
 
The successful integration of a flexible Irish developmental state into the global 
economy in this period is seen to have three interacting but distinct elements. 
Attracting foreign investment followed by efforts to embed it through linkages into 
the local economy, cultivating dynamic indigenous capacity as in the software case 
and engineering `a series of national neocorporatist social partnership agreements 
since 1987 [which] have created a stable macroeconomic and financial environment 
that has underpinned industrial transformation, while mediating the relationship of 
unionized workers and welfare recipients to the global economy’ (O’Riain 2000: 85-
86).  
 
Yet long-lasting and successful in some respects as the post-1987 partnership 
approach has been, it seems to have been almost as unsuccessful as the 1960s 
productivity drive was in translating its agreed national level statements into effective 
joint action involving management and employees on the ground within industry. 
Roche (1997: 119) notes that `the neo-corporatist consensus has extended beyond 
distributional issues to encompass industrial policy and the wider question of Ireland’s 
competitive advantage in the international economy…[through statements that] all 
turn away from advocacy of a low cost, low wage route to competitiveness and 
instead promote an understanding of Ireland’s competitive advantage as entailing the 
creation of a high skill, knowledge intensive and dynamic economy with core sectors 
competing internationally in upstream product and service markets’. But: 
 
Notwithstanding the emergence of effective neo-corporatist exchange between 
the social partners on distributional issues like pay, taxation and public 
spending, attempts to realign the Irish industrial relations system in pursuit of a 
high-road competitive strategy have to date been hampered by deadlock and 
paralysis. While the `social partners’ have developed a stable distribution 
coalition, they have not shown a capacity to develop an effective productivity 
coalition (Roche 1997: 121-122 - see also Roche 2007: 67-69) 
 
The failure of enterprise partnerships to take off raises doubt about the general 
validity of the flexible development state characterisation of 1990s Ireland. One 
software swallow does not make an industrial Summer and this case may belong to a 
series of striking but misleading exceptions thrown up by the Irish pattern of 
industrialisation. Southern Ireland could, after all, boast of having the largest brewery 
in the world before it became politically independent with a miniscule industrial base. 
Waterford Glass could export successfully to the USA after World War Two when 
consultants scoured the state without finding other enterprises with products for which 
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it was considered worthwhile recommending US market research. Jefferson Smurfit 
could emerge from a tariff-dependent industry that appeared particularly threatened 
by the freeing of European trade in the late 1950s to successfully internationalise its 
business.   
 
Lies, Damn Lies and Contemporary Irish Productivity Statistics 
Barry, Bradley and O’Malley (1999: 51) calculate that US plants are `five times as 
productive and eight times as profitable’ as Irish ones. Funded by the Marshall Plan, 
the Ibec Technical Services Corporation’s report Industrial Potentials of Ireland: An 
Appraisal attempted to estimate the dimensions of the `productivity gap’ between 
Irish and US industry in 1952:  
 
Table 1 Estimated Operating Ratios Per Person Employed: US and Irish 
Industry 
 
Category Ratio US to Ireland 
Gross output  2.1 to 1 
Value Added 3.0 to 1 
Wage and Salary Payments 3.0 to 1 
Materials Costs 1.6 to 1 
Profits before taxes 3.4 to 1 
Investment in fixed assets 2.9 to 1 
Source: Ibec Technical Services Corporation (1952: 38) 
  
Lagging behind to a much greater extent than half a century earlier, contemporary 
Ireland would appear to stand in very urgent need of an effective productivity 
coalition to launch a vigorous new productivity drive. However, a reassuring footnote 
to the 1999 exercise adds that `these comparisons are, of course, heavily distorted by 
transfer pricing’.  Transfer pricing is the setting of prices in transactions that are not 
`at arm’s length’ – for example, when one company sells goods to another company, 
but both companies have common ownership. Here prices may be set at an arbitrary 
figure unrelated to costs incurred, to operations carried out or to value added. A 
motive for setting arbitrary prices may be to maximize the common owner’s after-tax 
revenue by shifting profits in a manner that minimizes the total amount of tax paid.  
 
Multinational corporations can engage in extensive transfer pricing because a large 
amount of trade nowadays consists of one affiliate of corporation X (say, a subsidiary 
running a manufacturing plant in Dublin which utilises patented technology developed 
by a separate corporate unit in the United States) selling goods to another affiliate of the 
same corporation (say, a subsidiary based in Frankfurt whose function is to handle sales 
and marketing in Europe).  With business being conducted `all within the family’ like 
this, opportunities for tax-efficient collusion are plentiful.  Transactions between the 
three entities can be organised to show a big profit where a very low corporate tax rate 
prevails (Ireland) and a token one where corporate tax rates are higher (as in Germany 
and USA).  
 
Awareness of the significant prevalence of this phenomenon first developed in Ireland 
in the early 1980s. Table 9.1 reproduces a table published by economist Jim O' Leary in 
an Irish Independent article in November 1984.  It shows in its first column the income 
earned by US companies in different European countries.  In column 2 it shows the 
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value of the investments these companies held in each of the countries.  The third 
column calculates a rate of return on capital invested by expressing the figures in 
column 1 as a percentage of those in column 2.  Finally, the fourth column states the 
rate at which tax is levied on corporation profits by each of the countries. The exercise 
revealed dramatic divergence in the rates of return enjoyed by US companies. What 
could account for the contrast between the United Kingdom’s 3 per cent and Ireland’s 
24 per cent? Only the difference in corporate tax rates that provided an incentive to 
artificially inflate declared profits where they are least taxed. 
 
Shortly before this article appeared the chief executive of the Irish Productivity Centre 
had  
described the figures for net output per worker in Ireland’s chemical and computer 
industries as `unreal’ (Irish Times 1984). Two decades later, in 2004, an article in the 
Quarterly Bulletin of the Central Bank referred to the `measurement difficulties’ to 
which productivity trends in Irish manufacturing industry were subject as a result of 
transfer pricing by foreign owned firms, particularly those in the chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals sector. A comparison made between Ireland and the EU average on the 
measure of gross value added per person employed underlined the point by illustrating 
the enormous variation in the differences to be found across a range of industrial 
sectors: 
 
Table 2 How US companies declared their European Profits circa 1984 
State Income 
($ million) 
Investment 
($ million) 
Rate of 
Return 
(%) 
Corporate 
Tax Rate (%) 
Belgium/Luxembourg  99 3,100   3.2 48.0 
Denmark  26     275   9.5 40.0 
France -70 4,501  -1.6 50.0 
Germany 552 9,991   5.5 50.0 
Greece   -8      85  -9.4 N/A 
Ireland 693 2,888 24.0 0-10* 
Italy 298 3,076   9.7 36.0 
Netherlands 269 3,295   8.2 48.0 
United Kingdom 406 12,951   3.1 52.0 
Source: O’Leary (1984) 
* Some Irish-based companies were then operating under the Export Profits Tax Relief (EPTR) scheme 
introduced in the late 1950s which was then being abolished on a phased basis at the insistence of the 
European Commission.  They could qualify for a zero tax rate if all their output went for export (even if 
some of it later got shipped back in to service the Irish market).  EPTR was replaced by a 10% tax rate on 
all Irish corporate profits.  This, as Table 9.1 shows, was very low by European standards. 
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Table 3 Gross Value Added Per Person Employed (Euro thousand), 2000  
 
Industrial Sector Ireland European Union
Total Manufacturing 132.2 51.5 
Chemicals 532.9 92.5 
Electrical and optical equipment 121.9 59.5 
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 168.3 58.8 
Transport Equipment   55.1 57.7 
Other Machinery and Equipment  48.7 51.0 
Other non-metallic mineral products  69.3 50.2 
Rubber and plastic products  44.6 47.1 
Basic metals  43.9 46.4 
Food, beverages and tobacco  94.6 44.9 
Wood and wood products  39.3 33.9 
Textiles  29.8 29.5 
Leather products  28.3 26.8 
 Source: Cassidy (2004) Table 5 
 
Although it subscribes to OECD tax conventions that proscribe the practice, the Irish 
state has not taken – and is unlikely of its own volition to take - action to curb transfer 
pricing. It is effectively getting something for nothing, and that something is a large and 
growing stream of tax revenue that helps it deliver both high public expenditure and 
domestic personal tax cuts in its social partnership agreements. Transfer pricing, from 
the Irish state point of view, represents a new and more lucrative version of the 
Hospitals Sweepstake that used to help fund the health care system with the proceeds of 
lottery tickets sold illegally in Britain and North America (Webb 1968). Less easy to 
understand than Irish inaction is the muted reaction both of USA and of other European 
Union states that lose out on substantial amounts of corporate tax revenue as a result of 
transfer pricing. There the media occasionally draw public attention to this fact. One 
such occasion occurred in late 2005 when the Wall Street Journal reported that 
Microsoft had saved $500 million on its US tax bill by transferring intellectual 
property rights to Irish-based corporate units. Shortly afterwards Microsoft 
reregistered the companies in question with unlimited liability at the Companies 
Office in Dublin. This removed the obligation to file company accounts publicly and 
shielded the activities of these tax efficiency vehicles from further scrutiny (Irish 
Times 2006a) 
 
Technical expertise was always central to the pursuit of higher productivity but 
nowadays it is not technique of the engineering variety that holds centre stage as it did 
in the years after World War Two but that of the accountant and the tax lawyer. When 
in 1952 IBEC Technical Services Corporation suggested that, by establishing the right 
economic climate in Ireland, foreign capital `could be attracted in considerable 
volume to what would amount to a haven from state-imposed restrictions that are so 
widely prevalent in Europe’ who could have envisaged the burgeoning of a tax haven 
on present day lines? The Irish were then urged to act and think boldly and no one 
could now accuse them of not having done so. As `a prominent Boston tax lawyer’ 
commented `it seems to us in the US that Ireland continues to try and better itself, to 
make itself more and more attractive’ (Irish Times 2005). Shortly after the Microsoft 
company re-registrations an Irish economist who has tracked the tax dimension to 
foreign investment in Ireland since the 1980s, Antoin Murphy, opined that the current 
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advantageous corporation tax structure might have as little as ten to fifteen years of 
life left before European Union corporate tax harmonisation consigns it to history 
(Irish Times 2006b). But, even for experts, such forecasting is hazardous, as the report 
EPA’s Adrianus Vermeulen wrote after first visiting Shannon in November 1959 
illustrates: 
 
The Shannon Development plan is part of the Government policy to attract 
foreign industries to Ireland thus decreasing unemployment which is 
extraordinarily high in some regions… This must be borne in mind when judging 
the facilities which Ireland is offering to foreign companies.   The Irish 
Government grants total exemption from income tax and Corporation Profits Tax 
for a period of 25 years for profits derived from export business; partial 
exemption from local taxation on land and building… complete freedom to 
repatriate profits and capital gains at any time. I have pointed out to the 
authorities concerned that these kind of facilities are only acceptable - from an 
economic point of view – against the background of the serious unemployment 
situation but that it is obvious that when the situation has changed and Ireland 
reaches full employment, these kind of facilities will be the first ones to be 
criticised and abolished.1 
 
Strangled by Americanisation? Unionisation of Irish Private Sector Industry 
From a prima facie case of grand larceny where shouts of `stop thief!’ are surprisingly 
muted, we turn to one of attempted murder. The victim of the crime is the Irish trade 
union movement. Its chief perpetrator is US corporate culture.   
 
When the post-war productivity drive got under way Europe’s `free’ (non-communist) 
unions were heavily wooed by US government aid agencies. With the Marshall Plan 
being `the New Deal writ large’ (Raymond 1985: 321), US trade union officials were 
strongly represented alongside those drawn from business, academic life and elsewhere 
on the staff of these agencies. The Benton Amendment of the 1951 Mutual Security Act 
mandated US aid policy to promote the development of `the free labor union 
movements as the collective bargaining agencies of labor’ in Europe. The following 
year the Moody Amendment of a second piece of Mutual Security legislation 
stipulated that aid policy should aim for `equitable sharing of the benefits of increased 
production and productivity between consumers, workers and owners’. Headed by 
Adrianus Vermeulen, EPA had a Trade Union Section whose links to the US union 
movement were strong.   
 
But then the New Deal died. A period stretching from the 1930s up to the 1960s during 
which the U.S. corporate mainstream accepted unions as an inevitable, and - within 
limits – useful, fact of life was succeeded by an era in which top management now 
routinely includes maintaining a non-union operation among its strategic objectives.  
This influences where it will site new investment.  Within the United States highly 
unionised areas are avoided and regions where unions have not flourished are favoured.  
The north-east and mid-west have had rustbelt status thrust upon them in part through 
such disinvestment: the south and south-west, on the other hand, have enjoyed rapid 
growth.  
The new industrial relations is not merely a matter of where you put plants, it is also a 
question of how you run them.  Here many of the firms which opt for union avoidance 
have developed a new style of management, the Human Resources approach.  This is 
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not the crude speed-up style which flourished in the era of F.W. Taylor and Henry Ford 
and prompted those exposed to it to flock into trade unions in the first place.  It is a 
`sophisticated paternalism’ that seeks to integrate workers into the company, fostering a 
strong unitary organisational culture and introducing work practices designed to 
dissipate or preempt the deprivations and dissatisfactions of industrial working life that 
employees have looked to unions to address.  
 
What effect has the rise of the new industrial relations had on union density in the U.S. 
economy?  Statistics show the level of unionisation to have declined in every sector 
except that of Government employment.  In 1956 34% of the U.S. non-agricultural 
private sector workforce were trade union members, by 1980 this had fallen to 24%.  In 
1994 the authors of the best-known analysis of the transformation of US industrial 
relations were noting that `the coverage and appeal of the traditional collective 
bargaining system in the United States continues to shrink… no new industries, new 
employers or growing occupations have been organized by traditional unions in recent 
decades’ (Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1994: ix). 
 
There is a statutory procedure in the USA for deciding whether or not a union is entitled 
to recognition from an employer.  Once a union is certified by the agency enforcing the 
law as having the support of a majority of the workforce the employer is obliged to 
bargain with it.  Employers for their part enjoy the right to apply to have a union 
decertified on the grounds that it is no longer representative of the workforce's wishes.  
In the USA a union normally has to present a substantial number of signed authorisation 
cards to the National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) which then proceeds to hold an 
election in which the whole workforce of the bargaining unit votes on whether or not 
the union should be certified as its bargaining agent. 
 
It is then that problems tend to arise for US unions.  NLRB elections are often subject to 
long delays during which managements will usually mount sustained and sophisticated 
anti-union campaigns. There are many consultancy firms specialising in this union 
busting.  Borrowing from Human Resources thinking to make their labour relations 
more positive and openly arguing the case that certifying a union will not improve 
matters are perfectly legal employer responses which can be effective in securing a no 
vote.  But there is strong evidence that victimisation and illegal practices are also 
frequently brought into play to defeat union campaigns for recognition. While the 
number of elections ordered by the NLRB hardly changed between 1960 and 1980 the 
number of complaints of illegal sackings of union supporters rose threefold while the 
number of back pay or reinstatement awards made to complainants by the NLRB 
multiplied by five (Freeman and Medoff 1984). 
 
U.S. trade unionists are bitter about the light penalties employers face when they are 
found guilty of breaking the law in this way and their spokesmen complain that, with 
Republican Presidents favourable to big business interests occupying the White House 
for all but twelve of the last forty years, the NLRB itself has been stuffed with 
appointees who, far from being impartial, are hostile to organised labour’s viewpoint. In 
2000 Human Rights Watch produced a report that endorsed this case and catalogued 
numerous infringements of US workers’ right to freedom of association (Human Rights 
Watch 2000).  
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In Ireland the issue of union recognition within new foreign-owned industries was first 
sharply posed in Shannon where an EPA-supported vision of creating a model industrial 
community emerged briefly at the start of the 1960s (Murray forthcoming). EI, a 
subsidiary of US General Electric, located in Shannon as this vision was vanishing in 
1962. Six years later, when the Irish Transport and General Workers Union (ITGWU) 
called a strike to gain recognition from the company, it was the airport zone’s largest 
employer, daily bussing in a large proportion of its 1,200-strong workforce from far-
flung parts of Clare, Limerick and Tipperary. The burning by the IRA of one of the 
buses used was one notable incident of a bitter strike that ended in a victory for the 
union and, on foot of the recommendations of a committee of inquiry set up by the 
Department of Labour, a new norm for the wider foreign-owned sector. IDA now 
informed potential investors that: 
 
There is no legislation that compels an employer to recognize or negotiate with a 
trade union but it is virtually universal practice for employers to recognize and 
negotiate with a union or unions of which its employees are members. Where 
more than one union represents employees it is usual practice to negotiate the 
unions on a collective basis (IDA 1973) 
 
However within the pattern that emerged on the ground in the wake of the EI dispute 
the norm was for foreign-owned plants to a have single union with whom an agreement 
had been signed prior to the plant going into production. To secure easy recognition 
Irish unions often confined their representation to hourly-paid grades, foregoing the 
recruitment of large sections of the workforce that would often be unionised in other 
types of employment. They also agreed to restrict the scope of what could be bargained 
about to a fairly narrow range of issues (Murray and Wickham 1985). The union with 
whom such an agreement was signed was almost invariably the ITGWU. To an extent, 
this was unsurprising as new foreign-owned industry was widely dispersed around the 
country by the IDA and the only union with a national branch network was the ITGWU. 
But on the east coast, where other general unions were long established, there were 
allegations of an orchestrated exclusion of these unions by IDA (Merrigan 1987). IDA’s 
relationship with ITGWU during the 1970s recalled the closeness of Fianna Fail to the 
ITGWU-dominated Congress of Irish Unions during the 1940s (Allen 1997: Dunphy 
1995). What critics saw as the ITGWU’s indulgence in the `sweetheart deals’ that were 
giving it a monopoly on representation in new foreign-owned plants generated 
considerable friction within the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU).  
 
Rank-and-file revolt against such arrangements also occasionally occurred, as in 
Ferenka’s Limerick plant in the mid-1970s (Jacobsen 1994: 120-123).  In a survey of 
industrial relations carried out in and around Limerick city in the wake of Ferenka’s 
closure, shop stewards were asked whether the existing union arrangement had been 
chosen by the workers or agreed over their heads. Table 9.3 sets out the responses:  
 
Table 4  Was union was chosen by workers or agreed by management and union ? 
Response Foreign-owned plant (%) Irish-owned plants (%) 
Chosen by workers 25 77.6 
Not chosen by workers  75 22.4 
Source: Wallace (1982: 148) 
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In the early 1980s ICTU set up a special committee to deal with inter-union tensions in 
relation to the organization of new firms. But the agreement it sketched out (ICTU 
Annual Report 1982: 96-98) was to be overtaken by events. Incoming US corporations 
increasingly eschewed host country industrial relations norms and opted to replicate the 
union-free environment with which they were familiar at home - `union avoidance 
strategies began to take hold around the early 1980s, became significantly more 
commonplace as the decade progressed, and are now characteristic of the majority of 
greenfield site firms in the manufacturing and internationally traded services sectors’ 
(Muller-Camen et al. 2001: 440).   This shift away from the earlier pattern of managed 
unionization has occurred with IDA acquiescence: 
 
The IDA has moved from its traditional policy of encouraging incoming 
multinationals to concede union recognition and engage in collective bargaining. 
Ireland can now be presented to potential investors as a location where companies 
can and do operate on a non-union basis. The Authority is responsive to the 
demands by non-union multinationals that no initiatives be undertaken that might 
impose trade union recognition or uniform representation arrangements on the 
non-union sector (Roche 1997: 121) 
 
Today union density in Ireland is plummeting as it did earlier in the USA – down from 
46 per cent to 35 per cent of those at work in ten years and standing at around 28 per 
cent in the private sector (Roche 2007: 70). Employer resistance to union recognition 
appears to be intensifying. Also a US-style resort to illegality now forms part of the 
employers’ strategic repertoire with a recent survey of union officials reporting a 
substantial incidence of activist victimisation and illegal dismissal (D’Art and Turner 
2005: 134). What Freeman and Medoff (1984) in the USA termed `the slow 
strangulation of private sector unionism’ seems well on its way to being replicated on 
this side of the Atlantic. 
 
 It remains to be seen where the situation in which `unions have been invited to become 
partners in the macroeconomy but appear increasingly unwelcome partners in the 
workplace’ (Roche 2007: 75-76) will lead in the future.   As 2008 ends, a world 
economic crisis has commentators invoking Wall Street Crash analogies.   With the 
election of Barack Obama as US President, there is a sense abroad that one political-
economic era has definitively ended and that a new one is about to begin. Optimistic 
scenarios envisage that the `change’ Obama invoked during his election campaigns 
could be translated into a progressive programme of reform that emulates the 1932 New 
Deal of his Democratic predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt. If this is so, interesting times 
could lie ahead for transfer-pricing US multinationals, for the Irish state that 
accommodates and profits from their practices as well as for the beleaguered trade 
union movements of Ireland and the USA. 
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 NOTES 
 
1 National Archives, Department of Foreign Affairs 305/57/168/474 E.P.A. – Cooperation 
with Shannon Development Authority, Report on Visit to Ireland, 13th-17th November, 1957 
Project 6/06, EPA/HU/2619 
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